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tion," that the affective and presentative elements are uniformly conjoined. Yet in treating of the 'abstract sentiments,' he says that "the exercise of each of the intellectual functions, discrimination and assimilation, has its own affective accompaniment" [II, p. 128]. This statement would seem to indicate that the presentative element in 'relational emotions' is the mind's consciousness of its own activity in the exercise of one of its functions. But the consciousness of activity is as such not a presentative phenomenon according to Mr. Sully. In the section on "Characteristics of Conation," he tells us that "Our consciousness of activity is based upon the common peculiarities of our muscular sensibility." He does not, however, agree with Münsterberg in "viewing active experiences *merely* as a group of presentative elements or sensations." Active consciousness is an aspect, a peculiar characteristic, of muscular sensations, quite apart from their aspect as presentatives and wholly *sui generis*. Even in attention "the characteristic *psychical* factor" is contributed by muscular action [I, p. 148]. We are therefore obliged to conclude either that there is no presentative phenomenon to which the feeling, *e.g.*, of logical consistency is attached, or else that the said feeling accompanies the *presentative* aspect of muscular sensation. No clue to a solution is furnished by the author. Mr. Sully holds to the 'efferent' theory of muscular sensation, and mentions Wundt as its chief supporter: an error which has been long since corrected.

In general, it may be said of *The Human Mind* that it is one of those books which have a recognized place in the literature of every science: a fair and tolerably complete statement of fact, erring only on the side of conservatism, with no battles to fight, and feeling not too heavily the burden of unsolved problems. Its attitude on disputed questions is, as its author says with regard to the 'muscular sense,' 'conciliatory.' All this, of course, is quite as it should be in a text-book. One could, however, wish that a fuller statement and criticism of extreme views had more frequently preceded their rejection.

MARGARET WASHBURN.

*Aspects of Theism.* By WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews. London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1893. — pp. viii, 220.

Those who are acquainted with Professor Knight's *Studies in Philosophy and Literature* (1879) and with his admirable work as editor of the Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, will welcome with

interest this latest product of his philosophic thinking. In 1890, as the author tells us in his preface, he was called upon to deliver a course of lectures on theism before the Theological College at Salisbury. These lectures were given again in London in 1891, and are now published with some additions in the present volume. After the introductory chapter, in which the problem and the outline of its solution are set forth, two chapters are devoted to a cursory sketch of the historical development of the theistic idea. In the next two chapters on 'Inadequate and Partial Theism,' the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological arguments are presented and criticised in the conventional manner. The essential error in Descartes' argument is clearly shown, but our author fails to point out the peculiar subtlety which has given this form of the ontological proof such a vivid semblance of solidity. Descartes says: "Necessary existence is contained in the nature or the concept of God. Hence it may be with truth affirmed that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists." '*Necessary existence*' is simply transmuted into '*necessary existence*,' and the change of emphasis and the double meaning of 'necessary' make the illusion almost perfect. In the teleological argument two branches are distinguished; first, the popular argument from design, which is subjected to some fifteen pages of criticism and pronounced 'fallacious,' 'illusory,' and 'incomplete'; and second, the argument which the author calls a 'nomotheological one,' and which he states as follows: "Another branch is the argument from the order of the Universe,—the types or laws of Nature, indicating, it is said, an Orderer or law-giver whose intelligence we discern. In this case it is not that the adjustment of means to ends proves the presence of a mind that has adjusted them; but that the law itself, in its regularity and continuity, implies a mind behind it, an intelligence animating the otherwise soul-less universe." (p. 60.) No further statement or criticism of this argument is given. If by this is meant that the intelligibility of phenomena implies that they are manifestations of intelligence, we can only wish that this view had been subjected to the same critical scrutiny as the more common forms of the design-argument. In the next two chapters, on 'the Metaphysics of Physics' and on 'Causality,' the constructive effort of the book begins, and this effort culminates in the next, the eighth chapter, which is entitled 'the Evidence of Intuition.' A few quotations will best show the view of intuitive evidence which is found to cover the only sufficient and the all convincing ground for theistic belief. "Intuition is the root of all evidence. . . . The only

ground on which we can trust the reports of consciousness is that they assure us *clare et distincte* of the truth of things. . . . The evidence of Sense rests on Intuition. . . . We 'intuite' a thing, or see into it, by instinct or second sight. . . . The evidence it brings us may be implicit, as well as explicit. . . . An intuition may often slumber in an individual or in a race. . . . The more delicate the insight the rarer the endowment. . . . The evidence of no faculty is to be set aside, merely because it is possessed by few. . . . The intuition of the Infinite—which is the root of Theism—being necessarily rarer in common experience than the knowledge and recognition of the finite, is not therefore to be less esteemed or less deferred to as an attestation of reality. . . . It is the spontaneous utterance of human nature in presence of the Object whose existence it attests, and as such it is necessarily prior to any act of reflection upon its own character, validity or significance. . . . This, then, is the main characteristic of the theistic intuition. It announces the existence of a transcendent Being, *whom it apprehends in the act of revealing itself*. . . . The ontologist and the teleologist unconsciously show their own portrait, and, by an effort of thought, project it outward on the canvas of infinity. The intuitionist, on the other hand, perceives that a revelation has been made to him, descending as through a break in the cloud, which closes again." We are told in the note on p. 122 that 'every intuition is ultimate, and carries its own evidence within it,' and yet, strange to say, on the very same page we are told that intuitive knowledge must be tested by reflection, so that no illusion be mistaken for reality. Four tests of an intuition are offered: its persistence and tenacity, historical prominence, interior harmony with other intuitions, influence in elevating character. This seems very much like the geometer's attempt to prove his axioms. We fear our intuitionist is falling back into rationalism, else why should 'ultimates' need 'tests'? Granting the full solidity of the intuition to him who has it, it is confessedly individual and transitory, and nothing is said to show how it can become evidence to others, who may doubt either the fact or the interpretation of the intuition.

The remaining chapters are devoted to corroborating from various points of view the central testimony of intuition. Agnosticism receives some trenchant criticisms, but none that strike one as at all new. The distinction which our author would make between the monistic theism which he advocates, and the pantheism which he condemns, is far from clear. To regard phenomena as "the garment we see Him by" seems to be good theism on page 11 and dangerous

pantheism on page 150. On page 170 we read: "We, the finite, require the presence of a non-ego beyond us, in order to self-consciousness. This is a condition of the self-consciousness of the finite; but it is surely conceivable that the Infinite may dispense with this condition because of its infinity." But yet two pages further on we are told that "if God possesses consciousness, there must to him be not only a subject knowing, but also an object known. . . . A subject without an object would not be conscious of anything," and there is nothing in the context to modify the discrepancy between these views.

It is perhaps the illusory character of the intuitive evidence on which the author puts his main dependence that gives the work as a whole such an air of incoherence. The literary tone of the book is excellent. While it contains little that is original or new to the mature student, the beginner will find it a pretty complete summary of the difficulties in the theistic problem, and, however strongly one may feel that the constructive effort fails of reaching the desired goal, there is much that is suggestive and stimulating to positive thought. There is plenty of excellent material offered, only the central synthetic principle is lacking.

F. C. FRENCH.

*Secularism, Its Progress and Its Morals.* By JOHN M. BONHAM.  
New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894. — 396 pp.

Mr. Bonham's book is professedly written from the standpoint of modern science. In his work on "Industrial Liberty," which appeared about six years ago, he showed himself an earnest disciple of Herbert Spencer. The present volume evinces the same general characteristics; at times, however, the radicalism of the author leads him to reject some of Mr. Spencer's most cherished views. This is especially true concerning the value to be placed upon the conception of the Unknowable. The writer agrees that science points unmistakably to an Ultimate Power back of phenomena. He insists, however, that it is not only unscientific, but unfruitful of any moral result, to clothe our conclusions with reference to the fact of such an existence beyond the bound of our reason with any such sense of reverence as the term religion implies. To make that of which we can know nothing the ground of religion, is to him the height of absurdity.

Mr. Bonham holds that impersonal surroundings, and not discursive argument, is the most potent influence in the intellectual progress of the masses, and determines their views upon theology.